Abstract
INTRODUCTION
The principle of open justice underpins the trial procedures of common law systems but is subject to exceptions, such as name suppression orders, 2 that in the main seek to ensure trials 4 
II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES A

Open Justice and Exceptions
Public access has long been a definitive characteristic of the common law trial process, 16 and
this principle of open justice has been universalised, notably through its incorporation into the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR')
. 17 Open justice 'requires that proceedings should be held in open court, to which the public and press are admitted'. 18 The principle 'is primarily concerned with the sound functioning of the judicial process in the public interest'. 19 The House of Lords' decision in Scott v Scott 20 is generally considered to provide the definitive common law statement on exceptions to the principle of open justice, 21 which 'are themselves the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle that the chief object of Courts of justice must be to secure that justice is done'. 22 Consequently, 'it must be shown 16 'The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back beyond reliable historical records ... What is significant for present purposes is that, that the paramount object of securing that justice is done would really be doubtful of attainment if the order were not made'. 23 Supplementing the common law, 24 the Australian Constitution provides a fundamental
grounding both for open justice and its restriction, 25 and numerous statutes at a State level provide for varied exceptions to the general principle. 26 In addition to the rules of contempt, 27 name suppression orders, 'are preventative strategies' issued in order 'to ward off prejudice that might otherwise impair the fairness of a specific trial on account of publicity that might influence the jury'. 28 In New Zealand, a court's powers to restrict open justice in criminal proceedings have been codified, 29 although the broad language in which the discretion is couched renders it ostensibly unfettered. 30 However, since 'the starting point must always be the importance in a democracy of freedom of speech, open judicial proceedings, and the right of the media to report the latter fairly … the prima facie presumption as to reporting is always in favour of openness'. 31 Since criminal proceedings typically distress, embarrass and
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Ibid 439. 24 For an outline of the common law grounds for a court sitting in camera, see Butler and Rodrick, above n 1, 166-173. 25 Notably Australian Constitution, ch III. Butler should be public; and the prohibition provisions infringed the implied constitutional guarantee of free political communication. 26 Butler A
Traditional Media and the Courts
Due to their divergent interests -the media's desire for access to information and the courts' concerns for ensuring a fair trial -a degree of tension between the two institutions seems inevitable. 66 Nevertheless, relations between the courts and media may be generally characterised as interdependent, even collaborative. 67 Thus, Justice Frankfurter said: 68 at their core, a form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity', whereas American law 'is much more oriented toward values of liberty'. As Australasian jurisdictions adopt bills of rights, it is possible that concepts of privacy, derived from human dignity, might take a more prominent role in jurisprudence. However, as Mount, above n 15 , 442 notes, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ)
has had an 'expansive influence on press freedom', a development which may be problematic for individual privacy. 
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The freedom of the press, in itself, presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. For Lord Diplock, because the media ensure 'the way that courts behave cannot be hidden from the public ear and eye this provides a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy', 69 and so 'it is through the media that the courts acquire their credibility and account to the wider community'. 70 Idealising, perhaps, the judiciary-media relationship, Linda Greenhouse says:
71 … these two institutions [are], to some degree, partners in a mutual democratic enterprise to which both must acknowledge responsibility. The responsibility of the press is to commit the resources necessary to give the public the most accurate and contextual reporting possible about the Court, its work, its members, and its relationship with other branches of government. The Court's responsibility is to remove unnecessary obstacles to accomplishing that task.
Since only a small proportion of the population might attend a particular trial, the media are said to act as surrogates for the public, 72 'although it must be borne in mind that only those proceedings which are regarded as newsworthy will attract media attention'.
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News is 'perishable', 74 and so its newsworthiness and consequent commercial value atrophy if publication is delayed. But whether there is a pressing public interest in 'immediacy compared with deferred reporting' is not obvious. 75 And so, as Chief Justice Searches of this nature are problematic because a mass communication medium is used to convey a message to a select audience of 'followers'. The analogy might be drawn to an eavesdropper on a dinner party disclosure, if it were not for that fact that current technology enables anyone with a modem to eavesdrop on the 'conversation'.
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As Harvey, above n 81, 324 observes: 'The ability to locate information using search engines returns us to the print-based properties of fixity and preservation, and also enhances the digital property of "the document that does not die".' It seems implausible that juries might be eliminated from such trials if loyalty to common law traditions is to be maintained. And it is these trials that attract most public interest, even prurience.
Once juries are charged with deciding issues of fact, various means can be used to ensure a fair trial. In contrast to other common law systems, the 'United States approach is to The features of a jury trial that serve to ensure its integrity include the rules of evidence and jurors' determining their verdict solely on the evidence adduced during the trial.
125
Common law courts 'have developed over many centuries a series of elaborate procedures and rules for channelling, and in some respects restricting, the flow of information made available to jurors' which 'ensure that jurors decide the case upon the evidence that is allowed to be adduced in the trial and which has been tested in accordance with the common law mechanism of trial'. 126 From a layperson's perspective, these restrictive rules may constitute a counter-intuitive way of searching for the truth. Indeed, research has shown that 122 Spigelman, above n 51, 162. 
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See also Bell, above n 128.
'juries simply did not seem to appreciate the importance, or did not understand the logic, of restricting themselves to the information presented by the parties and the judge'. 127 The possibility has always existed, then, that, in a search for the truth, jurors might carry out their own research beyond the admissible evidence adduced during the trial. 128 It is incumbent on judges to instruct and, ideally, to explain to juries why they should restrict their deliberations to the evidence presented to them in court. Empirical research indicates that jury decisionmaking is characterised by a very high level of conscientiousness in following the judge's instructions and in endeavouring to understand the law and to apply it to the facts fairly, The internet poses a challenge to the ability to ensure that a fair trial has occurred and renders less efficacious some of the mechanisms hitherto adopted to insulate the tribunal of fact from available information about the accused and witnesses or about the events.
The internet opens up the prospects of new forms of misbehaviour by jurors during the course of the trial, by directly accessing the internet to acquire information about the events, about an accused or a witness, or for the purpose of checking expert evidence.
Not only can jurors access information with a speed and to a depth previously unimaginable, new media tools, such as blogs, Twitter and Facebook, enable them to publish their thoughts and conclusions. Nevertheless, whatever technology and temptations are available to jurors, the pertinent issue remains whether or not they obey the instructions of the court.
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Judicial Responses
Empirical research conducted in Australasia indicates that, although jurors are unlikely to recall and thus be prejudiced by the detail of pre-trial publicity, members of the public become sensitised to publicity about a case when they are empanelled. 138 However, the impact of media publicity both before and during the trial is minimal, 139 … there is clearly a need for relations between the media and the judiciary to be improved … Each institution needs to find means to co-exist happily with the other. One useful exercise in that process would be for each side to explain as clearly as possible its 178 Butler and Rodrick, above n 1, 246.
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Chesterman, above n 6, 111. 
